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Abstract
This paper builds on insights of R. E. Lucas, in which economic growth emerges as the
collective result of the productivity of a large collection of agents. The evolution in each
individual agent’s productivity is idealized as a Brownian motion with a positive drift,
consisting of two parts: an individual component representing innovation attempts and a
time-dependent component resulting from mutual interactions between agents. The inter-
actions are defined either via an exogenous imitation process or via endogenous mean-field
game (MFG) dynamics in which every player aims at minimizing a mean-field cost func-
tion. For exogenous strategies, depending on the imitation strength, we analytically unveil
the existence of a bifurcation threshold that separates diffusive versus flocking produc-
tivity propagation represented by a soliton. We then construct a class of MFG objective
functions for which the ergodic stationary state produces the soliton emerging from the
imitation exogenous strategies. This enables us to shed new light on the emerging coop-
erative behavior of complex systems, most particularly for those emerging in economics.
While the presented results are analytically exact, we complement our study by perform-
ing an extended set of simulation experiments to illustrate that the proposed framework
remains generically valid for perturbed situations that cannot be computed analytically.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we adopt the vision presented by R. E. Lucas in [Lucas Jr., 2009]1 and con-
sider a growing economy as resulting from the emergence of a collective dynamic pattern
generated by a large swarm of mutually interacting (and possibly stochastic) agents. The
improvement in productivity achieved by each acting agent in the economy ultimately
generates economic growth. Specifically, we consider productivity growth to be driven by
the joint action of (i) a sustained flow of innovative attempts that are subject to ran-
dom fluctuations and (ii) an imitation process among the agents that acts as a rectifying
mechanism and thus ensures that only productive ideas are ultimately retained.
The same concept is also implicit in the classical work of A. A. Alchian [Alchian, 1950],
who interprets [...] the economic system as an adaptive mechanism which chooses ex-
ploratory actions generated by the adaptive pursuit of success or profits. This highlights
that a growing economy has to always be maintained out of equilibrium, as there is a con-
stant need for technology leaders, who will generate innovative ideas and processes. The
innovation attempts generate noise and thus constantly throw the system out of equi-
librium. The innovative breakthroughs are then tested and evaluated, and ultimately,
only the best breakthroughs are adopted by the other agents. This dynamic coaction
between the innovation and imitation processes can be seen as one of the key factors
that sustain economic growth. By imitating only successful ideas, the imitation process
systematically filters out the poor results that are unavoidable when risky innovation
moves are attempted. As a result, imitation makes it possible to steadily scavenge a
positive output from the inherently noisy innovative environment. In other words, eco-
nomic growth results from the cooperative interplay between a fluctuating mechanism
(innovation) and a mechanism that is deterministic (imitation). Eliminating either of
these two mechanisms leads to a reduction in (or even a cancellation of) progress. The
presence of noise in the innovation process, together with the imitation mechanism in
which laggards try to catch leaders, also reflects the basic idea initially developed by J.
F. Reinganum in [Reinganum, 1985] that [...] success does not imply that the successful
firm reaps monopoly profits forever after; rather, it does so only until the next, ”better”
1The same vision was later adopted in [Ridley, 2010, Staley, 2011, Luttmer, 2012, Lucas Jr. and Moll, 2014].
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innovation is developed [...], on which P. Aghion and P. Howitt build their famous model
of growth [Aghion and Howitt, 1992].
In [Lucas Jr., 2009, Luttmer, 2012, Lucas Jr. and Moll, 2014], the dynamics is driven by
a Poisson process, which enables imitation due to meetings between the individuals. In
the event of an encounter between two agents, the agents both quit this meeting with the
maximum between their two productivities. In the present contribution, the dynamics is
a diffusion process, and the imitation mechanism adopted is different, as an agent does
not instantaneously adopt the productivity of an encountered peer, but increases her pro-
ductivity drift by initiating a transition toward the productivity of the observed leading
fellow. In this paper, our economy consists of a continuum of scalar agents, represented
by their productivity, and the agents’ distribution describes the global productivity state.
The evolution of this distribution over time is modeled as a process of agents improving
their productivity by meeting and comparing with each other. We investigate how a finite
observation range for the imitation process, as well as the strength of the influence of the
productivity leaders, affects the global emerging growth regime.
To proceed toward a mathematical stylization of these ideas, we consider a collection of N
agents Ak (k = 1, 2, · · · , N) who are co-evolving according to a set of N coupled stochastic
differential equations (SDE)2 of the general form:

dXk(t) = αkdt+ σdWk(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
innovation process
+J
(
Xk(t), ~X(t)
)
dt,︸ ︷︷ ︸
mutual imitation kernel
for k = 1, 2, · · · , N,
~X(t) = (X1(t), X2(t), · · · , XN (t)) ,
(1)
where:
(i) as in [Staley, 2011], Xk(t) ∈ R stands for the time-dependent position of agent Ak
on an abstract productivity line R,
(ii) the constant drift αk ≥ 0 represents the average individual capability of agent Ak
to innovate and thus to enhance her productivity,
(iii) as in [Luttmer, 2012], Wk(t) are independent Brownian motion (BM) processes that
represent the intrinsically risky character underlying the innovation process,
(iv) J
[
Xk(t), ~X(t)
]
is a nonlinear interaction kernel that implements the imitation
mechanism.
2The SDE dynamics given in Eq.(1) differs from the ones studied in [Lucas Jr., 2009, Staley, 2011,
Lucas Jr. and Moll, 2014]. In these papers, the starting point is a pure Markovian positive jump process.
Jump processes can be approximated by positively drifted SDEs driven by white Gaussian noise (WGN)
[van Kampen, 1981], resulting in a positively drifted stochastic process.
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For a large collection of agents who share a common individual drift (N → ∞, αk = α,
∀k), a mean-field (MF) approach can be used to rewrite the dynamics of a representative
agent in terms of the agents’ density ρ(x, t) := 1N
∑N
k=1 δ(x − Xk(t)). Consequently, we
are left with the following resulting equation:
dX(t) = αdt+ σdW (t) + J (X(t), ρ(x, t))dt
∫
R ρ(x, t)dx ≡ 1,
(2)
where the MF drift J (x(t), ρ(x, t)), which fully characterizes the agents’ mutual inter-
actions, is defined in the latter either exogenously (Section 2) or endogenously (Section 3).
Exogenous Imitation Strategy.
The imitation drift J
(
Xk(t), ~X(t)
)
in Eq.(1) is devised to model how an agent Ak en-
hances her drift by observing, within a finite range of size U , the positions Xj(t), j 6= k, of
her leading fellow agents. Large U -neighborhoods imply that even remote leaders influence
the dynamics of the agent crowd, and we effectively describe in this situation a society
composed of competitive agents who try to imitate all their leaders, even those who are
further away. Conversely, small U -neighborhoods correspond to more complacent agents,
as only very close leaders influence the dynamics. Complacent agents effectively adopt a
more risk-averse strategy, by imitating only the leaders in their close neighborhood. In the
sequel, we highlight a transition between two drastically different growth regimes. When
the level of mutual interactions is below a critical threshold, diffusive behavior dominates
and cooperative growth (i.e. a stationary stable wave) cannot be sustained. Conversely,
when the imitation strength exceeds the bifurcation threshold, the diffusion due to noise
is counterbalanced by the agents’ mimetic tendency, which gives rise to a balanced growth
path (i.e. a soliton wave). In this second regime, the influence of the productivity leaders
is observed to be determinant for the inequality distribution in the economy. The type
of bifurcation separating these two propagation modes was illustrated by A. de Geus in
[de Geus, 2002], who borrowed a spectacular example from ornithology (a more detailed
account is provided in Appendix A). Similarly to what is happening here, any reduction
in the agents’ observation range decreases the role of the mutual interactions inside the
swarm and consequently reduces the propensity to generate collective pattern dynamics
(i.e. the tendency to flock). This suggests that below a critical threshold, mutual inter-
actions are too weak to sustain a flocked evolution (and thus a balanced growth path),
[Cucker and Smale, 2007, Hongler et al., 2014].
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Endogenous Imitation Strategy.
In this case, the drift a∗(X(t)) := α+ J (a(X(t)), Xi(·)) in Eq.(2) stands for the optimal
drift that minimizes the cost functional J [α(X(s), Xi(s))] in the following mean-field game
(MFG): 
dXi(t) = a
∗(Xi(t), t)dt+ σdWi(t), i = 1, , · · · , N
J (a(·), Xi(·)) = min{a∈A}E
{∫ T
0 L(a(t), ρ(·, s), Xi(t), t)
}
+ cT (Xi(T )),
L (a(t), ρ(·, s), Xi(s), s) := c (a(t), Xi(t), t)− V [ρ(·, s), Xi(s))}
(3)
where A stands for the set of all admissible drifts a(X(t), the operator E {·} is the expecta-
tion over the possible outputs of the noise source, T is the time horizon, and L (x(s), ρ(·, s))
is an instantaneous cost function3. For a large number of similar anonymous economic
agents, the MFG framework provides a useful approach for studying the influence of
mutual interactions in an economy. The MFG dynamics relies on the maximization of
individual objective functions that incorporate the state of all agents in the whole econ-
omy. This maximization introduces an intrinsic forward/backward dynamic structure (i.e.
Fokker-Planck/Hamilton-Bellman-Jacobi dynamics), which explicitly reflects that antic-
ipation mechanisms are taken into account. Accordingly, the constructed MFG offers
a very natural mathematical framework to study how proactivity drives the strength of
the mutual interactions created in the economy, and what global behavior is ultimately
expected to arise.
1.1 Literature Review
Popularity is often a determining factor in deciding which restaurants, fashion stores,
tourist destinations, and schools to patronize [Banerjee, 1992]. Clearly, imitation pro-
cesses (or, occasionally, their opposite, anti-conformism) play a determinant role in our
daily decision-making behaviors. In this regard, imitation has a powerful influence on
the diffusion of innovation, on the productivity of people, and on the resulting economic
growth. This particular fact was first addressed in the pioneering work of J. A. Schumpeter
[Schumpeter, 1939], and then in subsequent contributions (e.g. [Jovanovic and Rob, 1990]),
where the importance of imitation waves in the diffusion of innovation and the formation
of business cycles is demonstrated. A natural approach in the literature is to model the in-
terplay of innovation diffusion by considering the collective dynamics of large communities
of mutually imitating agents, in which the agents constantly gather information regard-
ing the dynamic state of their peers. This steady information gleaning induces a strong
3The notation L (x(t), ρ(·, t), t) means that the function L associates to the density function ρ(·, t) another
function L (ρ(·, t)) itself evaluated at x. Thus, the agent at x interacts with the remaining fellow agents only
via their density function (in the MF approach, agents are indistinguishable).
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nonlinearity that influences the collective evolutionary pattern of the swarm. In economic
modeling, this approach is commonly adopted, for example, in [Lucas Jr., 2009], who con-
siders a continuum of interacting agents, in Schlag [Schlag, 1998], who discusses evolu-
tionary game models, in [Iwai, 1984, Iwai, 2000], where deterministic ordinary differential
equations are used, in [Jovanovic, 1979], who uses sets of stochastic differential equa-
tions, and in [LeBaron, 2006, LeBaron and Tesfatsion, 2008], who propose agent-based
computational approaches. Recent contributions study collective agent dynamics in dis-
crete time frameworks [Perla and Tonetti, 2014] or in continuous time [Lucas Jr., 2009,
Luttmer, 2012, Lucas Jr. and Moll, 2014, Benhabib et al., 2014]. From now on, we focus
solely on continuous time evolution as this is the framework adopted in this paper.
In a seminal contribution, R. E. Lucas and B. Moll [Lucas Jr. and Moll, 2014] consider
a collection of agents who divide their time between producing goods and interact-
ing with productivity leaders to improve their own production capabilities. As in our
present study, the dynamics in [Lucas Jr. and Moll, 2014] is driven by an underlying
stochastic environment, and a mean-field approach in continuous time is adopted. In
[Lucas Jr. and Moll, 2014], the modeling approach relies on individual utility functions
and focuses on the resulting stochastic optimal control problems (i.e. one effectively
deals with an MFG). In the context of an MFG, all players in the society are mutu-
ally interacting, and thus the observation range between the agents is effectively infinite.
However, contrary to the class of individual objective functions we discuss in Section 3,
a flocking-diffusive bifurcation does not exist in [Lucas Jr. and Moll, 2014], even when
the imitation intensity decreases with agent dispersion. Building on [Lucas Jr., 2009,
Lucas Jr. and Moll, 2014] and closely related to our present paper, E. Luttmer intro-
duces randomness to the evolution of each agent’s individual innovation attempts. Aligned
with our findings in Section 2, E. Luttmer emphasizes the mandatory joint roles played
by innovation and imitation to ultimately enable a balanced growth path. While in
[Luttmer, 2012] (and also in [Lucas Jr., 2009, Lucas Jr. and Moll, 2014]), the random en-
vironment driving the imitation is modeled with a Poisson process, in the present pa-
per, we consider diffusion processes driven by white Gaussian noise sources. A related
dynamics was recently proposed in [Ichiba et al., 2011], who analytically discuss the col-
lective evolution of heterogeneously drifted Brownian motion agents interacting via their
ranks (i.e. laggards try to catch leaders, thus also triggering a specific type of imita-
tion mechanism). Using a deterministic evolution, J. Benhabib, J. Perla, and C. Tonetti
[Benhabib et al., 2014] analytically study the collective evolution of a large collection of
heterogeneous agents who improve their productivity by optimizing a portfolio of imitation
and innovation investments. In this deterministic framework, the mutual interactions are
based on an endogenously evolving technology frontier. The frontier determines the eco-
nomic incentives for the catch-up and the fall-back. Along the same lines, a recent paper
[Koenig et al., 2016] models productivity growth as the outcome of in-house research and
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development (R&D; innovation) and replication of competitors’ technology (imitation).
The authors focus on the agents’ choice between these two strategies, with individual
profit maximization as the objective. It is shown that technology leaders tend to choose
in-house R&D as they get fewer imitation opportunities, while the cost-effective choice for
technology laggards is to imitate more productive competitors. This behavior is in perfect
adequation with the dynamics exhibited by our present model. In addition to identifying
the best evolutionary moves, imitation has also been widely recognized as a catalyst for
innovation [Collins, 2015]. Alternatively, depending on the intensity, in certain cases, imi-
tation mechanisms may also become detrimental, as is pointed out in [Aghion et al., 2001].
The present work is related to [Staley, 2011], who also introduces an agent-based model
to study growth in an economy. In [Staley, 2011], economic ideas are ranked according to
their productive usefulness on the rungs of a scalar quality ladder. Economic agents have
an incentive to adopt a higher productive state by jumping at random times either to a
higher rung that is already occupied by another agent (the imitation process) or to a higher
rung without any side considerations (the innovation process). For a large population of
agents and for ladders with a large number of rungs, the natural approach is to describe
the aggregated state of the agent swarm by a measure density function ρ(x, t) that quan-
tifies the density of agents at a given position x at a given time t. In [Staley, 2011], the
author shows how for a large population of agents, ρ(x, t) solves a deterministic nonlinear
reaction-diffusion equation (NRDE). The density ρ(x, t) exhibits a stable traveling wave
character (i.e. a soliton), which represents a steadily growing economy. The deterministic
character of the resulting NRDE dynamics follows as, for large swarms, the individual
fluctuations are smoothed out according to the law of large numbers, leading to the MF
approximation. Note that the NRDE derived in [Staley, 2011] results from an exogenous
strategy where infinite range interactions govern the transition dynamics4. In Section 2
of the present paper, we allow more flexibility for the imitation mechanisms between the
agents. Specifically, we investigate explicitly how the agents’ observation range and the
imitation strength affect the collective growth evolution.
In addition to these closely related works, the present work may also be viewed as a direct
and natural generalization of the Schumpeterian innovation-imitation dynamics initially
introduced by K. Iwai in [Iwai, 1984], and later extended in [Henkin and Polterovich, 1991,
Iwai, 2000]. The starting point of these studies is an evolution equation for the agents’
density ρ(x, t) achieving an abstract productivity level x at a given time t. However,
while in [Iwai, 1984, Henkin and Polterovich, 1991, Iwai, 2000], each agent’s drift is de-
termined in real-time by the interactions that follow from an infinite observation range
(i.e. a given agent is influenced by all of her leaders or all of her laggards), in Sec-
4See Section 2, Points 1 and 2 in [Staley, 2011], where the state transition rates depend on
∫ x
−∞ ρ(x, t)dx
and
∫∞
x
ρ(x, t)dx, ρ(x, t) being the measure density function.
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tion 2, we allow the observation range to be an exogenously controlled variable. This
additional degree of freedom unveils a new, range-dependent, transition between two
drastically different productivity propagation regimes. When the imitation is relatively
weak (i.e. complacent agents), we observe diffusive propagation with an evanescent
shape for asymptotically large times. This has to be contrasted with the situations
where agents imitate leaders who are remote. These long-range interactions give rise
to stable stationary productivity waves similar to those observed in [Staley, 2011] and
[Iwai, 1984, Henkin and Polterovich, 1991, Iwai, 2000].
The exogenous approach exposed (in Section 2) is complemented (in Section 3) by con-
sidering the endogenous evolutions that emerge from an MFG description. Following the
pioneering works proposed in this field5, we consider an infinite number of players aim-
ing at the minimization of their specific individual objective function. For our particular
class of models, we use the recent contribution by [Swiecicki et al., 2016] to analytically
derive the stationary productivity waves that correspond exactly to MFG ergodic states
as discussed in [Cardaliaguet et al., 2013].
1.2 Outlook
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we further refine the dynamics given
in Eq.(1) by considering homogeneous swarms of agents, namely αk ≡ α. Without fun-
damentally altering the general behavior that we intend to unveil, these simplifying as-
sumptions, which reduce the dynamics to Markov diffusion processes, make it possible to
obtain explicit tractable results. As a consequence, in Section 2.1 we analytically observe
that for short observation ranges, a vanishing diffusive propagating wave emerges from
the imitation process. Alternatively, for very large observation ranges, a self-organized
cooperative long wave is sustained. In Section 2.2, we consider infinite observation ranges
but also introduce the concept of conformism, the effect of which modulates the strength
of imitation according to the agents’ relative distance from the barycenter of the swarm.
In Section 2.3, we present a set of experimental simulations to cover situations that are
not amenable to exact calculations. In Section 3, using an MFG approach, we construct
a corresponding endogenous strategy that matches the outputs observed in Section 2.2.
Concluding remarks can be found in Section 4.
2 Exogenous Imitation Strategy
The objective of this section is to study the influence of the imitation strength on the
emergence of long-wave productivity growth. To this aim, exogenous imitation strategies
5Let us cite here, among others, [Lasry and Lions, 2006a, Lasry and Lions, 2006b, Lasry and Lions, 2007,
Huang et al., 2007, Gue´ant, 2009, Lachapelle et al., 2010, Gue´ant et al., 2011, Carmona et al., 2012,
Carmona and Delarue, 2013, Achdou et al., 2014, Lucas Jr. and Moll, 2014, Gomes et al., 2015].
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are implemented. This framework allows to analyze the characteristics of the imitation
process under which sustained growth can emerge. Specifically, we will further refine the
dynamics given in Eq.(1) by considering homogeneous swarms of agents, namely, cases
where αk ≡ α. Without fundamentally altering the general behavior that we intend to
unveil, these simplifying assumptions make it possible to obtain explicit tractable results.
Therefore, in Section 2.1 we analytically observe that for short observation ranges, a
vanishing diffusive propagating wave emerges from the imitation process. Alternatively,
for infinitely large observation ranges, a self-organized cooperative stable productivity
wave arises.
2.1 Range-Dependent Imitation Processes
Let us come back to Eq.(1), where we consider a collection of N interacting agents Ak
with the scalar state variable Xk(t), k = 1, 2, ..., N . The state variables evolve according
to a coupled set of nonlinear stochastic differential equations (SDEs):
dXk(t) = fk(Xk; ~X(t))dt+ σdWk(t), k = 1, 2, · · · , N and Xk(t) ∈ R,
Xk(t = 0) = xk,0,
(4)
where dWk(t) are N independent WGN sources, which represents the random environment
that affects the dynamics of agent k. The general drift fk(Xk; ~X(t)) is assumed to be
decomposable into an individual component and an interactive component:
fk(Xk; ~X(t)) := αk︸︷︷︸
individual dynamics
+ J
(
Xk(t); ~X(t)
)
.︸ ︷︷ ︸
interaction kernel
(5)
While in its full generality the dynamics given by Eq.(4) clearly offers a vast modeling
potential, our aim here is to construct a class of models that enable analytical tractability.
Accordingly, we now proceed to the following simplifying assumptions:
(a) Exogeneity. The imitation kernel specifies how agents enhance their productiv-
ity by observing the positions of the leading fellow agents located within a U -
neighborhood, the size of which is considered here as an exogenous control parameter
U .
(b) Agent Homogeneity. The heterogeneity between the agents’ dynamic strategies
reflected by the k-subscript in fk(·) will be removed, and therefore, we assume that:
αk(·) ≡ α, for k = 1, 2 · · · , N .
(c) Agent Imitation Process. The nonlinear kernel J (·) describes an imitation mech-
anism that will be stylized by the following algorithmic rules:
(i) Observation Capability of Agents. We assume that agent Ak is permanently
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able to observe the dynamic states of all her (N − 1) fellow agents Xj(t) for
j = 1, 2, · · · , k − 1, k + 1, · · · , N .
(ii) Rest on One’s Laurels. At time t, we consider a tagged agent Ak and assume
that Xk(t) > Xj(t), for an agent Aj , j 6= k. Then, our algorithmic rule imposes
that the presence of Aj does not modify the drift of Ak; namely, we have
J
[
Xk(t); ~X(t)
]
= 0. For this configuration, the drift in Eq.(5) simply reads as:
f(Xk; ~X(t)) = α iff Xj(t) < Xk(t), ∀ j 6= k. (6)
In other words, as the leader, agentAk feels no incentive to imitate the dynamics
of Aj , j 6= k. Accordingly, the nominal drift of Ak remains unchanged.
(iii) Avoid Being the Laggard. At time t, we consider a tagged agent Ak. Whenever
Xk(t) < Xj(t), for j 6= k, agent Ak realizes that she is a laggard. This incites her
to enhance her drift in order to reduce her lateness. We assume Ak is influenced
only by her neighboring leaders Aj , j 6= k, namely, those that have dynamic
states such that Xj(t) ∈ Ωk(t) := [Xk(t), Xk(t) + U ], where U ≥ 0 defines
an imitation range. Quantitatively, for each agent Aj found in Ωk(t), agent
Ak tries to reduce her lateness by adding a quantum of drift γ/N > 0 to her
nominal drift f(Xk; ~X(t)). The extra parameter γ ≥ 0 stands for the imitation
sensitivity of the agent, and it has the physical dimension of a frequency. Thus,
we have:
f(Xk; ~X(t)) = α+
N{k,U}
N
γ, (7)
where N{k,U} is the number of agents Aj , j 6= k, with Xj(t) ∈ Ωk(t).
Remarks.
(a) Perfect Information Modeling.
We emphasize that according to (i) and (iii), all agents are permanently informed about
the global dynamic state of the dynamics. However, the drift adaptations depend on the
imitation range U and not on the observation capability. The homogeneity assumption
implies that all agents of a given population share an identical value of U .
(b) No Agent Remains a Laggard Indefinitely.
For a given U <∞, assume that agent Ak is, at time t, a laggard with Xk(t) < Xj(t)+U ,
∀j 6= k. Then, according to rule (iii), agent Ak, who is currently overrun by all others,
would decide not to try to catch up with any of her fellow agents Aj , ∀j 6= k (i.e. Ak
has zero drift). We could then conclude that Ak remains a permanent outlying laggard.
However, noise in the Ak dynamics will ensure that the probability of Ak remaining a
laggard forever is null. As the WGN has unbounded variations, very remote agents will
never be isolated forever.
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For large N , the natural way to describe the global dynamic state of the multi-agent
system under consideration is to introduce a density field variable ρ(x, t), which is an
empirical probability density:
ρ(x, t)dx =
1
N
N∑
k=1
[Θ(x)Xk(t)] , Θ(x) :=
{
1 when x ∈ [x, x+ dx],
0 when x /∈ [x, x+ dx]. (8)
Homogeneity implies that agents are undistinguishable. Therefore, we can randomly tag a
single agent in the population and assume that her probabilistic behavior will be represen-
tative of the whole swarm. Furthermore, the influence of the whole swarm on the tagged
agent is aggregated into an effective external field; i.e. we adopt the well-established MF
approach. Introduced in statistical physics, the MF approach is well-known to offer a
powerful analytical tool for multi-agent models in general, and specifically in an economic
context (see, for example, [Karatzas and Fernholz, 2009]). For large N , the law of large
numbers holds, implying that the relative importance of the fluctuations decrease. Ul-
timately, for N → ∞, the MF approach yields exact results, and the density function
ρ(x, t) obeys a purely deterministic evolution equation.
In Eq.(4), the WGN sources affecting the dynamics imply the absence of noise corre-
lations, the continuity of the realizations, and the Markovian character of Xk(t). In
the presence of WGN, the Markovian aspect of the evolution ensures that all informa-
tion required to solve Eq.(4) is contained in the initial conditions xk,0. While the tran-
sient evolution obviously depends on these initial conditions, initial information is erased
asymptotically with time (due to the ergodicity of the dynamics). The WGN sources
together with the interaction rules given in Eqs.(6) and (7), when N → ∞, the result-
ing deterministic evolution takes the form of a nonlinear Fokker-Planck (NLFP) equation
[Hashemi et al., 2012, Hongler et al., 2014]:
∂t [ρ(x, t)] = −∂x

α+ γ ∫ x+U
x
ρ(y, t)dy︸ ︷︷ ︸
extra drift due to imitation
 ρ(x, t)
+ σ
2
2 ∂
2
xx [ρ(x, t)] ,
ρ(x, t) ∈ [0, 1] and lim|x|→∞ [ρ(x, t)] = 0,
(9)
where to write Eq.(9), we used the continuous representation:
lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
k=1
[Θ(x)Xk(t)] =
∫ x+U
x
ρ(y, t)dy. (10)
Thus, when U > 0 and γ > 0, we emphasize that Eq.(9) is a nonlinear and non-local
partial differential equation for ρ(x, t). Explicit solutions are not to be expected in full
generality. In the following, we now study two limiting regimes that can be analytically
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worked out. Later, in Section 2.3, a set of simulation experiments is presented to extend
the discussion to cases that cannot be solved analytically.
(A) Infinitesimal Imitation Range (Complacent Agents)
This regime assumes that interactions are effective only in an infinitesimal spatial
range U . This allows us to Taylor-expand (up to first order in U) the integral term
in Eq.(9) to obtain:

∂t [ρ(x, t)] = −∂x {[α+ (γU)ρ(x, t)] ρ(x, t)}+ σ22 ∂2xx [ρ(x, t)] ,
lim|x|→∞ [ρ(x, t)] = 0.
(11)
(B) Infinite Imitation Range (Competitive Agents)
For the extreme opposite case to regime (A), we can again explicitly work out the
dynamics in a differential form. Instead of the density ρ(x, t), which is involved in
Eq.(11), let us introduce and focus here on the complementary distribution function
G(x, t):
G(x, t) =
∫ ∞
x
ρ(y, t)dy ⇒ ∂xG(x, t) = −ρ(x, t). (12)
When U =∞, using the notation of Eq.(12) allows us to rewrite Eq.(9) as:

∂2x,t [G(x, t)] = −∂x {[α+ γG(x, t)] (∂xG(X, t))}+ σ
2
2 ∂
3
xxx [G(x, t)] ,
G(−∞, t) = 1 and G(+∞, t) = 0.
(13)
By integrating Eq.(13) once with respect to x and imposing a vanishing integration
constant (we effectively assume as usual that no probability current flows at infinity),
we immediately obtain:
∂t [G(x, t)] = −{[α+ γG(x, t)] ∂xG(X, t)}+ σ22 ∂2xx [G(x, t)] ,
G(−∞, t) = 1 and G(+∞, t) = 0.
(14)
Except for the boundary conditions, we observe that Eqs.(11) and (14) exhibit a fully
similar functional form. To now solve these partial differential equations (PDE), let us
first introduce the following change of referential: x 7→ z = [x− αt]. Thanks to this
Galilean transformation, Eqs.(11) and (14) reduce to the common functional form:
∂t [ϕ(z, t)] = −Γ∂z [ϕ(z, t)]2 + σ
2
2
∂2zz [ϕ(z, t)] , (15)
12
where the parameter Γ in Eq.(15) is suitably identified as:
Γ =

γU
2 and ϕ(z, t) := ρ(z, t) for the model given in Eq.(11),
γ
2 and ϕ(z, t) := G(z, t) for the model given in Eq.(14).
(16)
The time evolution of ϕ(z, t) as given by Eq.(15) is the celebrated nonlinear Burgers’
equation, which can be linearized by using a logarithmic transformation. The explicit
solutions are well-known and read as described in cases (A) and (B) below.
(A) Infinitesimal Imitation Range (Complacent Agents), c.f. Eq.(11)
For the boundary condition lim|x|→∞ [ϕ(z, t)] = 0 and for the initial condition
ϕ(z, 0) = F (z), the solution of Eq.(15), and subsequently the agent density function
solving the model described by Eq.(11), is given by (see Eq.(8.4.14) in [Debnath, 2005]):
ρ(z, t) = ϕ(z, t) =
∫
R
(
z−ζ
2Γt
)
e−(
f
2ν )dζ∫
R e
−( f2ν )dζ
, (17)
with the definitions:
ν =
σ2
4Γ
and f = f(ζ, z, t) =
∫ ζ
0
F (y)dy +
(z − ζ)2
2Γt
. (18)
In particular, in the presence of small noise intensity and for the initial condition
ϕ(z, 0) = F (z) = δ(z)Θ(z), the asymptotic behavior (i.e. t → ∞) of the dynamics
given by Eq.(17) can be approximately written as:
ρ(z, t) = ϕ(z, t) '

z
2Γt if 0 < z <
√
4Γt,
0 otherwise,
(19)
which, for this vanishing noise regime, converges toward a shock wave-like pattern,
as shown in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Collective dynamics observed for the infinitesimal imitation range as given by Eq.(17),
when γ = 1, α = 1, σ = 0.2, and U = 0.1. The interactions between the agents produce an
asymmetric shape for the density ρ(x, t), which propagates at speed (α + γU/2). Diffusion
precludes the formation of a stationary dynamic pattern. Thus, for t→∞, the density ρ(x, t)
flattens while remaining normalized to unity. Ultimately, the productivity states tend to be
widely dispersed (i.e. absence of flocking). The short-range imitation mechanism precludes the
productivity leaders to give rise to a stable growing productivity long wave.
(B) Infinite Imitation Range (Competitive Agents), c.f. Eq.(14)
In this case, the boundary conditions are equal to ϕ(−∞, t) = 1 and ϕ(+∞, t) = 0.
For any arbitrary initial condition ϕ(z, 0) = F (z), the solution of Eq.(15), and
subsequently the agent probability distribution that solves the model described by
Eq.(14), can be written for asymptotic time as the following traveling wave solution
(see Eq.(8.3.8 )in [Debnath, 2005]):
ϕ(z, t) =
1
2
[
1− tanh
(
Γ(z − Γ t)
σ2
)]
. (20)
Using Eq.(12), by differentiating Eq.(20), we determine that the agent density func-
tion solving the model described by Eq.(14) is a soliton-like propagating wave, as
shown in Figure 2:
ρ(z, t) = −∂zϕ(z, t) = Γ
2σ2 cosh2
(
Γ(z−Γ t)
σ2
) . (21)
It is interesting to observe the fundamentally different dynamic behaviors emanating in
the two regimes (A) and (B) exposed above, the solutions of which are given by Eqs.(17)
and (21). The variances s2(t) associated with Eqs.(17) and (21) can be explicitly written
14
Figure 2: Collective dynamics observed for the infinite imitation range, as given by Eq.(21),
when γ = 1, α = 1, and σ = 0.2. The imitation mechanism generates a collective productivity
long wave with constant variance, which travels at constant velocity (α + γ/2), without shape
alteration (the transient evolution is not represented in this figure). Thus, the agents remain
spatially tuned together (i.e. presence of flocking). They collectively progress on the abstract
productivity real line with constant dispersion. The large-range imitation mechanism favors
the influence of the leaders and ultimately generates a cooperative spatio-temporal pattern.
as:
s2(t) =
∫
R
(
z2
)
ρ(z, t) dz =

1
6(Γt) for short imitation range, c.f. case (A),
[
piB2
2
]
σ4
Γ2
for large imitation range, c.f. case (B).
(22)
Eq.(22) exhibits a structural change for agents that behave with short versus long im-
itation ranges. Only long-range imitation mechanisms sustain the emergence of stable
stationary traveling long waves (soliton-like) with constant variances. From shorter range
mimicry, the emergent dynamic pattern is dominated by diffusion. In that case, the vari-
ance of the productivity wave grows with time and ultimately leads to an evanescent
dynamic pattern (i.e. no stable constant variance productivity wave can survive). These
two drastically different productivity evolutions suggest that there should exist a criti-
cal imitation strength below which the stable long-wave dynamic pattern cannot survive.
This issue is addressed in the next section.
The growth rates that emerge in these regimes are equal to (A) α+ γU2 (U small) and (B)
α+ γ2 . In both cases, the engine of growth is composed of 2 components: The first term
(α) is the result of the individual attempts toward innovation, and the second term (γU2
or γ2 ) is the consequence of the mutual interactions. Aligned with the findings exposed in
[Luttmer, 2012], this shows that innovation and imitation together are ultimately required
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to create a balanced growth path.
2.2 Barycentric Modulation of Agents’ Interactions
We have thus far focused on limiting cases that involve infinitesimally short and infinitely
long-range imitation mechanisms. Let us now generalize our mutual interaction rule by
introducing a symmetric weighting G(x − 〈X(t)〉) = G(〈X(t)〉 − x) factor that depends
on the remoteness of each agent with the barycenter 〈X(t)〉 of her (N − 1) remaining
fellow agents. When G is a decreasing function of its argument, it will generate a con-
formist tendency as the agents attach more importance to average behavior. Conversely,
for increasing G’s, agents are more influenced by leaders or laggards. As in our model,
the imitation mechanism systematically depletes the laggard population in favor of the
leader population, and increasing the G-modulation effectively describes the strong influ-
ence of the frontier technology leaders. To summarize, we assume as before that agents
systematically tend to imitate their leaders, but we modulate the strength of imitation
with the idea that leaders who are far away are less influential than those who are close to
the crowd barycenter. Assuming once again the validity of the mean-field approach and
choosing γ = 1, we now generalize the interaction kernel given in Eq.(9) by writing:

∂t [ρ(x, t)] = −∂x

α+ ∫ ∞
x
G [y − 〈X(t)〉] ρ(y, t)dy︸ ︷︷ ︸
imitation modulated drift
 ρ(x, t)
+ σ
2
2 ∂
2
xx [ρ(x, t)] ,
ρ(x, t) ∈ [0, 1] and lim|x|→∞ [ρ(x, t)] = 0,
(23)
where 〈(X(t)〉 := ∫R xρ(x, t)dx is the swarm barycenter. Let us emphasize that in Eq.(23),
the imitation range is effectively infinite (i.e. the integral boundary is +∞). As in Section
2.1, we would like to investigate the possible existence of a stationary density with constant
variance and traveling velocity, namely, a solution of the form ρ(x − vt). In general, the
nonlinear and nonlocal character of Eq.(21) precludes us from finding an explicit analytical
solution. However, as shown in Appendix B, the specific choice:
G(x) = A(η, σ2) cosh−η(x),
A(η, σ2) = (2−η)[Γ(1−
η
2
]2
2ηΓ(2−η) σ
2, η ∈ [−∞, 2[,
(24)
leads to the explicit constant variance productivity long-wave growth:
ρ(x, t) = N [(2− η)] cosh(η−2)(x− (α+ w)t)
w = (2− η)σ22 , η ∈ [−∞, 2[
(25)
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where N [(2−η)] is the normalization factor of the density ρ(x, t). Note that the behavior
given by Eq.(25) does not exist for η ∈ [2,∞[.
From Eq.(25), three different regimes can be distinguished depending on the value of η:
(1) Complacency.
When the control parameter η ∈ [2,∞[, the effective interaction strength is too lim-
ited to give rise to flocked cooperative behavior. The decay exhibited by the function
G is strong, implying that only leaders close to the swarm barycenter affect the dy-
namics. This stylizes complacent behaviors where strong conformism dominates and
where productivity leaders have a negligible influence on their peers. Accordingly,
in this situation, no flocking traveling soliton wave can be sustained, and only a
diffusive time-evanescent wave results (with growing variance).
Conversely for η ∈]−∞, 2], flocking soliton waves emerge, and two distinctive strategies
can be highlighted.
(2.a) Conformism.
For η = [0, 2[, a conformist attitude dominates, as the function G given by Eq.(24)
exhibits a slow decay (remember that cosh−η(x) ' (1/2)e−ηx for x→∞), meaning
that remote leaders, while still influencing the dynamics, are given an importance
that decreases remotely. This stylizes a relatively moderate competitive attitude as
agents are ready to take into account outliers, but with reduced influential power.
(2.b) Progressivism.
For η < 0, the pace is given by leaders located close to the productivity frontier
(this results from the asymmetry of the model), which highlights a net progressive-
oriented attitude. Agents pay more attention to the productivity leaders than to
their fellow agents situated close to the crowd barycenter. This produces a decrease
in the tail of the agents’ distribution and thus sharpens the soliton wave. Note that
in the limit where η → −∞, the soliton collapses to a delta-peaked function traveling
at speed α+ γ2 .
Phase Transition
Therefore, for the modulation choice given by Eq.(24), the critical decay threshold η = 2 is
a bifurcation parameter, which separates two drastically different growth regimes. When
η > 2, growth cannot be sustained as the mutual interactions are too limited. Conversely,
when η < 2, the imitation strength is large enough to trigger long-wave growth. This
aspect has not been unveiled yet in the literature.
Agent Dispersion and Inequalities
As shown in Figure 3, the dispersion of the agents in the stationary state decreases with
the strength of interaction in the economy (i.e. when η decreases). A higher degree of
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Figure 3: Barycentric modulation functions cosh−η(x), for different values of η, and correspond-
ing collective productivity long-wave ρx, t.
imitation, jointly with larger influence of the productivity leaders, decreases the inequality
level between the agents6.
Policy Implications
Let us emphasize that the extra velocity component (i.e. the additional contribution
to the engine of growth) w that appears in Eq.(25) is entirely generated by the noise
sources. This component is the direct result of the systematic long-range imitation of
the leaders. Accordingly, w can be directly seen as a hidden benefit of the innovation
noise. Thus, the ultimate effect of imitation in an economy is to enhance the growth
in productivity of all the agents, and, as described above, it helps reduce the dispersion
between the agents’ productivity. In that regard, a deeper understanding of the central
role played by imitation mechanisms is essential in the development of efficient economic
policies. The diligence employed by individual agents in imitating the productivity leaders
is a critical factor. In this respect, the strong tendency of progressive agents to imitate
needs to be contrasted with complacent agents whose drift increases only in relation
to the productivity of close neighbors. The emergence of such productivity waves is a
desirable feature that should be extremely valuable to any policy maker. Therefore, policy
makers need to promote economic frameworks and conditions that encourage laggards
to imitate not only their close productivity neighbors but also the top leaders7. The
6Note that the stationary agents’ distribution exhibits an exponential tail. This behavior has to be contrasted
with the one exposed in [Luttmer, 2012], where a fat tail emerges.
7The beneficial effects expected by easier access to innovation is exemplified by the case of Tesla Motors,
[Rimmer, 2014]. After having first adopted a traditional and strict approach regarding the protection of its
intellectual property (IP), Tesla then switched to an open technology philosophy, to stimulate and enhance
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dynamics in our modeling framework is subject to productivity fluctuations, which is
unavoidable in any R&D environments. As also highlighted in [Luttmer, 2012], our results
suggest that the cooperative interplay between the noise and the ratchet effect (imitation
of leaders) generates stable productivity long waves. The hidden benefit of the noise,
which is inherent to the R&D process, is worthy of being highlighted for policy purposes.
Furthermore, in organizations, management should remain tolerant of such inherently
noisy R&D environments in order to favor long-time growth.
2.3 Simulations and Model Generality
To derive the exact results presented in Section 2.1, we were forced to impose several
stringent analytical limitations, namely: (a) the interaction range U is either infinites-
imally small or infinitely large, (b) the agent population is assumed to be very large
(effectively N →∞) for the mean-field approach to be strictly valid, (c) the use of WGN
to drive the evolution, and finally (d) homogeneity of the agent population. This set of
hypotheses is barely expected to be strictly realized in actual situations, and this raises
naturally the question regarding the validity of our observations and conclusions under
slight modifications of our basic analytical hypotheses. To discuss this fundamental issue,
we now report an extended set of simulations that illustrate that the analytic results in
Section 2.1 are not qualitatively affected by (slightly) relaxing the hypotheses needed to
derive exact solutions. In other words, we now examine the generic validity of our exactly
solvable modeling by addressing these issues.
(a) Finite Population of Agents
Strictly speaking, the mean-field approximation made in Eq.(8) requires an infinite
number N of agents to provide exact results. Nevertheless, as highlighted by the
simulation results displayed in Figures 4 and 5, the mean-field population dynamics
given by Eqs.(17) and (21) is already observed for the limited population of agents
N = 30, 100, and 1000.
the development of the electric car industry. Therefore, the growth in this industry has benefited from this
facilitated dissemination of new technologies. Note that Tesla’s position as a technology leader seems not have
been altered by this change in strategy. Not only has less money been spent in protecting IP (and consequently,
more research investment can be conceded), but also Tesla’s ability to hire the most talented engineers has been
strengthened (thus increasing the pace of Tesla’s innovation capability).
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Figure 4: Simulated collective dynamics observed for the infinitesimal imitation range when
U = 0.1, γ = 1, α = 1, σ = 0.2, and time discretization ∆t = 0.1. The simulated histograms
confirm the absence of a stable growing productivity long wave, as predicted by Eq.(17).
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Figure 5: Simulated collective dynamics observed for the infinite imitation range when U =
1000, γ = 1, α = 1, σ = 0.2, and time discretization ∆t = 0.1. The simulated histograms
confirm the generation of a stable growing productivity long wave with constant variance, as
predicted by Eq.(21).
(b) Arbitrary Interaction Range U .
To appreciate the influence of short interaction ranges as considered in Eq.(17), the
situation with U = 0.1 is compared to the strictly myopic situation that arises when
U = 0 (i.e. strictly independent agents evolve as N constant drifted Brownian
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motions). As shown in Figure 6, the purely diffusive behavior obtained for U = 0
noticeably differs from the interactive dynamics even for a small U .
Figure 6: Simulated collective dynamics observed for N = 1000 agents at t = 20, when γ = 1,
α = 1, σ = 0.2, and time discretization ∆t = 0.1. When the imitation range U = 0, purely
diffusive behavior is observed, where ρ(x, t) is symmetric and propagates at speed α. When
U = 0.1, as predicted by Eq.(17), the interactions between the agents produce an asymmetric
shape for the density ρ(x, t) and cause the propagation speed to be equal to (α + γU/2).
When the imitation range U lies in-between the two limiting regimes solved in
Eqs.(17) and (21), the propagation speed of the agent population density ρ(x, t)
is observed in Figure 7 to monotonously increase with U . Augmenting the inter-
action range U enhances the average traveling velocity of the whole population.
Specifically, the propagation speed is due to two contributions: (i) the individual
component α and (ii) the interactive component resulting directly from the agent in-
teractions. The extra drift due to mutual interactions lies between 0 (when U = 0)
and γ2 (when U = ∞), and it is observed to increase monotonically with U . As
displayed in Figure 8, the simulated traveling speed obtained for U = ∞ perfectly
matches the theoretical exact value α+ γ2 .
For regimes with U = ∞, it is possible to analytically compute only the stationary
propagating regime. Nevertheless, as highlighted in Figure 9, the simulations clearly
show that the transient state before stationarity is reached is definitely very short.
Only a few rounds of observation and imitation processes between the agents are
necessary to reach the stationary regime predicted by Eq.(21).
(c) Colored Noise Source as Stochastic Driving Sources
Strictly speaking, the WGN can be only an approximate modeling of the random
environment (the absence of correlations leading to an infinite energy spectrum is
obviously never strictly realized). In actual situations, only colored noise processes
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Figure 7: Simulated collective dynamics observed for N = 1000 agents at t = 50, when γ = 1,
α = 1, σ = 0.2, and time discretization ∆t = 0.1. As the propagation speed gets larger with
U , the barycenter of the agent population increases accordingly.
with finite correlations can be expected. Finite correlations will necessarily intro-
duce memory effects into the dynamics rendering the solutions of the underlying
stochastic process non-Markovian. Thus, imposing finite noise correlations enhances
the complexity of the analytic discussion. In [Hongler et al., 2014], the dynamics of
Eq.(1) when driven by a class of colored noise (namely, the Telegraphic process with
exponential correlations similar to the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process) has been ana-
lytically discussed. The discussion in [Hongler et al., 2014] shows that the presence
of correlations does not qualitatively alter the set of behaviors unveiled in Section 2.
(d) Heterogeneous Populations of Agents
In actual populations of agents, heterogeneity may enter in Eq.(1) in many differ-
ent ways, including different individual drift functions fk(Xk; ~X(t)), different noise
sources ξk(t), and obviously different interaction rules J
(
Xk(t), ~X(t)
)
(i.e. keep-
ing explicit k-dependences into Eq.(1)). The observations made in Section 2 are
not likely to remain valid for arbitrary heterogeneities. However, as shown in Fig-
ures 10 and 11, the introduction of heterogeneity in the agents’ individual drifts
does not qualitatively alter the set of behaviors unveiled in Section 2. Furthermore,
for the dynamics expressed in Eq.(1), heterogeneity may arise from the fact that
some agents, belonging to a subset E , do not obey the imitation rule implying that
J
(
Xk(t), ~X(t)
)
≡ 0 for k ∈ E . As we observe from Figures 4 and 5 that the coop-
erative behavior is qualitatively insensitive to the number N of agents, we can thus
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Figure 8: Simulated collective dynamics observed for N = 1000 agents, when γ = 1, α = 1,
σ = 0.2, and time discretization ∆t = 0.1. For U = 1000, the imitation mechanism generates
a collective productivity long wave with constant variance, which travels at constant velocity
(α + γ/2).
safely conclude that the interacting sub-population (i.e. the agents who do not be-
long to E) continues to exhibit the collective behaviors detailed in Section 2. Other
recent analytical discussions for cooperative evolution of specific heterogeneous pop-
ulations can be found in [Acebron et al., 2005] for agents evolving on a circular state
space and in [Ichiba et al., 2011] for agents interacting via their ranks.
3 Endogenous Growth and Mean-Field Games
In the preceding section, we showed how the imitation mechanism influences the propa-
gation of economic growth in a large population of interacting agents. While in Section
2, the agents’ imitation strategy was exogenously defined, we now focus on MFGs, and
more precisely when the global dynamics result from the output of an optimal control
problem in which agents minimize an individual objective function. This objective func-
tion is dependent on the global society of agents. In other words, we describe here how
the behaviors exposed in Section 2 also emerge from individual optimization strategies,
and therefore, how MFGs can be used to describe economic growth endogenously. The
aim is to show that the mean-field dynamics summarized in Eq.(23) and the propagating
soliton density given in Eq.(25) can alternatively be viewed as the ergodic solution of
an MFG, in the sense of [Cardaliaguet et al., 2013]. While, in Section 2, we considered
a strictly forward-in-time problem, the individual objective functions considered in this
section create the typical MFG forward-/backward-in-time dependency, which reflects the
anticipation mechanism that animates the agents’ optimal decisions.
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Figure 9: Simulated collective dynamics observed for N = 1000 agents and U = 1000, when
γ = 1, α = 1, σ = 0.2, and time discretization ∆t = 0.1. After 5 rounds of observation and
imitation process between the agents, the collective dynamics reaches its stationary state.
3.1 Mean-Field Game and Long-Wave Growth
We now focus on the cooperative range given by η ∈] − ∞, 2[. The basic question to
be addressed in this section is to construct an MFG that reproduces the flocking behav-
ior unveiled in Section 2.3. To construct the appropriate MFG, we strongly rely on the
recent contribution [Swiecicki et al., 2016], which builds on the pioneering works of the
MFG theory, e.g. [Lasry and Lions, 2006a, Gue´ant et al., 2011].
Let us consider the MFG defined by:
dXi(t) = a(Xi(t), t)dt+ σdWi(t), i = 1, , · · · , N
J (a(·), Xi(·)) = E
∫ T0 [c (a(s), Xi(s))− V [ρ(·, s), Xi(s))]︸ ︷︷ ︸
L(a(s),ρ(·,s),Xi(s))
ds+ cT (Xi(T ))
 ,
(26)
where E {·} is the average over the noise, ρ(x, t) := N−1∑i=Ni=1 δ(x −Xi(t)) is the agent
empirical density, and L is the individual aggregated instantaneous cost due to both in-
novation and imitation. When an agent increases her productivity, it will lead not only
to individual improved efficiency but also to a reduction in the number of peers she is in
competition with. To take advantage of these two aspects, there is an associated cost to
be paid for these expected improvements. This cost L differs over time among the agents,
depending on their state, since it is easier for a laggard to improve than for an agent who
is close to the technology frontier.
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Figure 10: Simulated collective dynamics observed for N = 1000 agents and U = 0.1, when
γ = 1, σ = 0.2, and time discretization ∆t = 0.1. The agents’ individual drift αk is uniformly
distributed in [0.95, 1.05] (the top graph, coefficient of variation CV = 0.03) and in [0.7, 1.3]
(the bottom graph, CV = 0.17). The simulated histograms show that the dynamics remains
qualitatively robust when the agents’ individual drift becomes heterogeneous.
In the sequel, we choose:
c (a(t), Xi(t)) =
µ
2 [(a(Xi(t), t)− b]2 ,
V [ρ(x, t), Xi(t)] = V [ρ(x, t)] = g [ρ(x, t)]
p , g > 0 and p > 0,
(27)
where the parameter p tunes the imitation strength, µ weights the drift adjustment cost,
and b denotes a target productivity growth rate. In a blind (i.e. without interaction) and
deterministic economy, each (isolated) agent would have to individually innovate at rate
b. According to Eq.(27), the interaction potential fully depends on the population density.
This highlights that the growth process is not only due to the agents who innovate but is
also a process that involves the whole agent population through the imitation mechanism.
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Figure 11: Simulated collective dynamics observed for N = 1000 agents and U = 1000, when
γ = 1, σ = 0.2, and time discretization ∆t = 0.1. The agents’ individual drift αk is uniformly
distributed in [0.8, 1.2] (the top graph, coefficient of variation CV = 0.12) and in [0.5, 1.5]
(the bottom graph, CV = 0.29). The simulated histograms show that the dynamics remains
qualitatively robust when the agents’ individual drift becomes heterogeneous.
Note that except for the presence of the b term, the objective function given by Eqs.(26)
and (27) coincides with the one given in [Swiecicki et al., 2016].
By defining the value function
u (x(t), t) := min
a(·)
{J (a(t), x(t))} , (28)
the MFG reduces to solving the forward-/backward-in-time set of coupled PDEs:
∂tρ(x, t) = ∂x
[(
1
µ∂xu(x, t)− b
)
ρ(x, t)
]
+ σ
2
2 ∂
2
xxρ(x, t), (FP)
∂tu(x, t)− ∂xb u(x, t)− 12µ [∂xu(x, t)]2 + σ
2
2 ∂
2
xxu(x, t) = −g [ρ(x, t)]p , (HJB)
(29)
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where the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation describes the optimal control prob-
lem of each individual agent and the Fokker-Planck (FK) equation drives the evolution of
the agent population. Observe that the b component of the drift can be straightforwardly
removed from Eq.(29) by the Gallilean transformation t 7→ t′ = t and x 7→ x′ := (x− bt).
This transformation of variables results in the following set of coupled PDEs:
∂tρ(x, t) = ∂x
[(
1
µ∂xu(x, t)
)
ρ(x, t)
]
+ σ
2
2 ∂
2
xxρ(x, t), (FP)
∂tu(x, t)− 12µ [∂xu(x, t)]2 + σ
2
2 ∂
2
xxu(x, t) = −g [ρ(x, t)]p . (HJB)
(30)
From this point, we follow the lines exposed in [Swiecicki et al., 2016] to get the resulting
ergodic agent density, which takes the following form8:
ρ(x) = N
[cosh(βx)]2/p
,
N = β
B
(
1
2
, 1
p
) ,
(31)
where B
(
1
2 ,
1
p
)
is the Beta function (see [Gradshteyn and Ryzhik, 1980], and the constant
β is given by Eq.(46) in Appendix C. Performing the inverse Gallilean transformation, we
obtain the following propagating soliton:
ρ(x− bt) = N
[cosh(β(x− bt)]2/p
(32)
Proceeding to the following identifications:
β = 1,
2
p
= 2− η and b = α+ 1
2
(2− η)σ2 = α+ σ
2
p
, (33)
the stationary solution given by Eq.(25) and the ergodic state of the MFG dynamics given
by Eq.(32) are identical.
Since, in Eq.(23), the existence of a soliton is secured for the parameter range η ∈ [−∞, 2[,
it implies that a direct comparison with an MFG exists only for p ∈ [1,∞[. Accordingly,
for p ∈ [0, 1] in Eq.(33), there is no exogenous imitation strategy, as defined in Section 2,
for which an ergodic state soliton that solves an MFG as defined by Eq (26) exists.
Solving the MFG determines the agents’ optimal trade-off between innovation and imi-
tation in terms of costs. Ultimately, each agent individually optimizes her imitation pat-
terns in order to reach the target productivity level b. A closer look at the specific form of
Eq.(33) reveals that the parameter p occurring in Eq.(27) affects only the barycentric mod-
ulation strength η, and thus, the agents’ imitation behavior. From Eq.(27), we observe
8For the convenience of the reader, the main steps of this calculation are shown briefly in Appendix C.
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that the roles played by the individual cost c (a(t), Xi(t)) and V (ρ(x, t)) = g (ρ(x, t)
p) can
be clearly identified. Specifically, we see that V (ρ(x, t)) influences only the sharpness of
the emerging soliton ρ(x, t) given by Eq.(43)) (i.e. the swarm cohesion). Concerning the
drift b, it also depends on the variance σ2. From Eq.(33), we observe that the sharpness
of the soliton coincides with an increase in the velocity propagation b. In other words,
when wide solitons that correspond to large values of p’s travel with slower velocity, the
thin solitons obtained for smaller values p travel faster. This results from the stronger
cooperation tendency taking place in the economy. As a result, the higher strength of
mutual interaction between the agents not only increases the growth rate but also reduces
the inequality level. This is aligned with the conclusions of [Luttmer, 2012].
4 Conclusion
We propose a fully analytically solvable model of multi-agent systems (MAS) to support
M. Ridley’s paradigmatic idea that growth in productivity is due to a collective mind,
emerging from the mutual actions of many interacting agents. In our modeling approach,
we analyze classes of dynamics for which the interactions are either exogenously or en-
dogenously determined, but where both cases generate an identical cooperative dynamics.
The exogenous approach is obtained when the MAS dynamic includes (i) a collection of
positively drifted scalar stochastic processes stylizing the individual risky attempts toward
innovation and (ii) an imitation mechanism (involving nonlinear mutual interactions) that
ultimately acts as a filter privileging the best innovative ideas. The endogenous approach
is obtained by implementing an MFG in which each agent aims at minimizing an indi-
vidual cost function that includes a functional dependence on the density of the entire
agent population. As the emerging cooperative behavior is identical, we can construct
a one-to-one correspondence between the MFG and the MAS flocked dynamics. We can
then observe the role played by the MFG objective function. Focusing on the functional
dependence of the agents’ density, we can unveil two different imitation rules in the MAS.
On the one hand, the imitation rule is mostly driven by the barycenter of the population,
and on the other hand, the imitation process is mainly conducted by the leaders (i.e.
those agents close to the technological frontier). Reducing the imitation strength in the
MAS dynamics, we reach a bifurcation threshold beyond which the flocked behavior is
destroyed, which yields a diffusive evolution that sustains only an evanescent propagation
wave. A corresponding MFG cannot be found when it comes to this diffusive behavior.
Accordingly, our model shows analytically that only a competitive attitude leads to the
propagation of a collective productivity long wave, and consequently to a balanced growth
path.
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Appendix A
Titmice versus robins: How territorial imitation ranges drastically affect col-
lective dynamics.
To illustrate the potential role played by the observation range in imitation processes, let
us turn toward ornithology and consider a situation originally studied by J. S. Wyles et al.
in [Wyles et al., 1983]). The authors develop the idea that evolution is essentially driven
by species behavior, rather than by the environment only. To support this view, they
consider the behavior of songbirds in Great Britain. According to [Wyles et al., 1983],
at the beginning of the 20th century, British milkmen used to leave milk bottles without
caps outside people’s homes. Two species of songbirds, the titmouse and the robin,
learned to feed on cream from these milk bottles. Then came an innovation in the milk
industry in the 1930s: covering milk bottles with aluminum bottle seals. According to
[Wyles et al., 1983], the titmouse learned to pierce the aluminum seals and, in a matter of
two decades, successfully spread this newly acquired technique across their entire species
throughout all of Great Britain, estimated at the time to be about a million individuals. In
contrast, the robin never widely learned the technique for drilling through the aluminum
seals. The reason behind this was the robin’s territorial inclination and the relative
isolation of individuals, which inhibited the spread of innovation. Further investigation
showed that the titmouse is mobile, and its behavior promoted the propagation of the new
approach. Because robins mainly act alone, they lacked the capability of exploring new
opportunities that existed in their environment. In contrast, the non-territorial titmouse
is able to learn and adapt to its environment in a quick and agile manner thanks to its
natural and efficient group mobility. In [de Geus, 2002], A. de Geus exhibits a parallel
between this ornithological example and the capacity to learn and to adapt quickly in
economic environments. De Geus shows that these aspects are determinant features in
the long-term survival of companies.
Appendix B
Solving the dynamics in the presence of the conformism modulation factor.
As in Section 2, we are interested in the possibility of observing a constant variance stable
wave of the form ρ(x− (α+w)t) := ρ(ξ) traveling with constant velocity (α+w), for the
dynamics given by Eq.(23). As a function of the new variable ξ = [x− (α+ w)t], Eq.(23)
takes the form:
0 = ∂ξ
[
ρ(ξ)
{
w −
∫ ∞
ξ
G (z) ρ(z)dz
}
+
σ2
2
∂ξρ(ξ)
]
. (34)
As the wave is assumed to be stationary with constant variance and with traveling velocity
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(α+ w), this imposes an additional constraint that w has to satisfy, namely:∫
R
ξρ(ξ)dξ = 0. (35)
Integrating Eq. (35) once with respect to ξ (with zero integration constant, as no proba-
bility current is sustained in the stationary regime), we get:
0 = ρ(ξ)
{
w −
∫ ∞
ξ
G (z) ρ(z)dz
}
+
σ2
2
∂ξρ(ξ). (36)
Then dividing by ρ(ξ) > 0, Eq.(36) can be rewritten as:
− σ
2
2
∂ξ log [ρ(ξ)] =
{
w −
∫ ∞
ξ
G (z) ρ(z)dz
}
. (37)
Modulating G factor for which an exact analytic resolution is possible.
Solving the nonlinear integro-differential equation given by Eq.(37) exactly is not feasible
in general. However, this is possible for symmetric barycentric modulation functions G of
the form (see Figure 12 for an illustration):
G(x) = A cosh−η(x), η ∈ R+, (38)
with A > 0 ∈ R+ and η ∈ R+. We now verify that it exists a solution of Eq.(37) in the
Figure 12: Considered class of barycentric modulation functions cosh−η(x). The transition
between propagation regimes emerges at η = 2.
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form:
ρ(ξ) = N (m) cosh−m(ξ) m ∈ R+, (39)
where N (m) is a normalization factor ensuring that ∫RN (m) coshm(ξ)dξ = 1. Namely,
here, N (m) = Γ[(m+1)/2]/√pi Γ(m/2), with Γ(z) standing for the gamma function. Note
that the existence of N (m) is ensured for m < 0. The choice given in Eq.(39) implies
that ρ(ξ) = ρ(−ξ), and therefore, Eq.(35) is automatically satisfied. Plugging Eq.(39)
into Eq.(37), we find:
σ2
2
m tanh(ξ) =
[
w −AN (m)
∫ ∞
ξ
cosh−(η+m)(ξ)dξ
]
. (40)
Using the identity
∫∞
x cosh(x)
−2dx = [1− tanh(x)], we verify that Eq.(40) is exactly
solved, provided that we simultaneously impose that:
η +m = 2, A = σ
2m
2N (m) and w = AN (m),
which can be rewritten as:
m = 2− η, A = σ
2√pimΓ(m/2)
2Γ[(m+ 1)/2]
=
(2− η)[Γ(1− η2 ]2
2ηΓ(2− η) σ
2, w =
1
2
mσ2. (41)
From Eqs.(40) and (41), we conclude that for η ∈] − ∞, 2[⇒ m > 0 (i.e. slow decay
of the G(x) modulation, leading to longer-range interactions), N (m) exists, and a stable
traveling solitary wave with velocity w is created. Conversely, when η ∈ [2,∞[⇒ m < 0
(i.e. rapid decay of the G(x) modulation, leading to short-range interactions), Eq.(41)
collapses as A < 0, and ρ(ξ) in Eq.(39) is not normalizable. In this case, no stable solitary
wave can be sustained for this η-parameter range.
Appendix C
After performing the Gallilean transformation of variables (we omit the primes for nota-
tion convenience), we proceed as shown in [Swiecicki et al., 2016]. Accordingly, we intro-
duce the Hopf-Cole logarithmic transformation u(x, t) = −µσ2 ln [Φ(x, t)] and Γ(x, t) =
m(x, t)/Φ(x, t) [Swiecicki et al., 2016, Gue´ant, 2012]), and the coupled PDEs Eq.(29)
transform to the set of nonlinear Schro¨dinger (NLS)-like equations:
−µσ2∂tΦ(x, t) = µσ42 ∂xxΦ(x, t) + V [ρ(x, t)]Φ(x, t),
+µσ2∂tΓ(x, t) =
µσ4
2 ∂xxΓ(x, t) + V [ρ(x, t)]Γ(x, t).
(42)
Invoking, as in [Swiecicki et al., 2016], the fundamental contribution of [Cardaliaguet et al., 2013],
we focus on times 0 << t << T , for which the dynamics is essentially insensitive to the
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boundary conditions. Focusing on this quasi-stationary ergodic state, as in [Swiecicki et al., 2016],
we write Φ(x, t) = e
− 
µσ2
t
Ψ(x) and Γ(x, t) = e

µσ2
t
Ψ(x) which leads to the NLS equation:
µσ4
2
∂xxΨ(x) + V [ρ(x)]Ψ(x) = Ψ(x). (43)
Now, we observe that with the specific choice:
V [ρ(x)] = g [ρ(x)]p = g [Ψ(x)]2p , g > 0, (44)
Eq.(42) can be integrated by separation of variables, namely:
dx =
dΨ(x)√
2
µσ4
Ψ(x)2 − 2g
(p+1)µσ4
Ψ(x)2(p+1)
, (45)
Using the identity cosh2(z) − 1 = sinh2(z), we can directly verify that Eq.(45) is solved
by the soliton-like (normalized) wave function:
Ψ(x) =
√
N
[cosh(βx)]1/p
,
(∫
R
dx
Ψ2(x)
= 1
)
,
β = p
√
2gNpp
(p+1)
√
µσ2
,
N = β
B
[
1
2
, 1
p
] ,
 = gN
p
(p+1) .
(46)
where B(x, y) := Γ(x)Γ(y)Γ(x+y) stands for the Beta function. In particular, we may obtain β = 1
for an appropriate choice of the MFG control parameters µ, g, p, σ. Finally, the ergodic
agents density itself follows directly as ρ(x) = [Ψ(x)]2.
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